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It is well known that the culture within which actors such as scientists and clinicians operate is 
structured by the mechanisms through which institutional rewards are distributed (Garfield 1979). In 
the biosciences, citation counts are the accepted markers of a researcher's originality and 
competence that permit access to funding, promotion and other forms of institutional support. 
Osborne and colleagues' (2009) study suggests that beneath this publication-driven reward system is 
a widespread indifference on the part of journals to the ethical/welfare issues that surround the use 
of animals for the purposes of science. Although the promotion of animal welfare is not necessarily a 
goal of the vast majority of scientific research, it is arguable that those who distribute the 
institutional rewards should also be accountable for the harms that occur during efforts directed at 
their attainment. Other studies of the effects of the dictum “publish or perish” on medicine and 
sciences such as psychology and ecology indicate that within this professional structure of reward 
through publication, editorial policies are one of the few levers that can rapidly affect a wholesale 
change to research practices (Fidler et al. 2004). Consequently the move to assign some 
responsibility to journals for the maintenance and promotion of animal welfare is a simple but 
significant step that could change the way the biosciences utilize non-human animals. Although we 
heartily commend Osborne and colleagues (2009) because their study should provoke some 
worthwhile ideas and their proposal has a great deal of merit, we believe that any change to 
editorial policies could, and in fact should, be extended to address other concerns beyond improving 
animal welfare. Our position is that any editorial prescription for what constitutes ‘good’ animal-
based science should also ensure that scientists are aware that the ethical permissibility of their 
research depends in part on the purpose for which it is undertaken, and the just distribution of any 
benefits. 
While we understand that the empirical focus of Osborne and colleagues' (2009) research limits the 
types of recommendations that can be made, we believe that any changes to editorial policies 
should do more to promote the interests of the animal participants than implementation of the 3Rs. 
The nub of our disagreement with Osborne and colleagues' recommendations rests on the 
recognition that moral philosophy and animal-welfare science have adopted similar approaches to 
animal-use in scientific and biomedical experimentation, yet come to different conclusions. This 
division can be best described as the difference between a focus on the ‘rights’ and a focus on the 
‘needs’ of the experimental subject (Fraser 1999). While the move to acknowledge that animals have 
‘interests’ has been the basis for the late–20th century reconceptualization of many approaches to 
the moral status of individual animals, proponents of a science of ‘welfare’ have not been bothered 
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with the larger metaphysical questions of how we ‘ought’ to behave towards other animals. They 
have concentrated on refining the description and further adaptation of research practices as being 
‘better’ or ‘worse’ at accommodating the needs of these animals. Consequently it is arguable that 
welfare-based approaches such as the 3Rs consistently underdetermine the interests of the subject 
of any experiments because they generally valorise the measurement of the relative conditions in 
which the animal is kept over any assessment of the potential utility of the knowledge produced for 
humankind or other animals (Broom 1991). Unfortunately from this perspective what is considered 
to be ‘good’ science then becomes a question of harm minimization rather than also providing an 
assessment of the likely utility or epistemic validity of individual experiments. In his writings on this 
subject, Bernard Rollin—one of the founders of the welfare-based approach to animal use—has 
consistently restated the point that science is not a ‘value-free’ enterprise. What Rollin (2006) means 
in this context is that sometimes epistemological and ethical issues cannot be clearly separated. 
While we understand that a pragmatic approach to animal-use focused on welfare is most likely to 
rapidly improve the lives of experimental animals, developments in the field of translational 
medicine indicate that perhaps the time for avoiding the larger issue has ended. 
The inability of the 3Rs to address the conflation of ethical and epistemological issues is most clearly 
evident in biomedicine where the continual failure of extrapolation or ‘translation’ of knowledge to 
humans has led to repeated calls for animal-based trials to be subjected to similar forms of 
experimental control and analysis as other types of medical evidence (Hackam 2007). A partial 
solution might be to reorganize our methods for addressing larger research questions. There are 
alternate comparative research strategies that come closer to reflecting more of the interests of the 
experimental subjects while still providing epistemic benefits. It has been argued that the 
prioritization of patient-focused research combined with the investigation of analogous spontaneous 
animal diseases is a methodology that is far more likely to provide fruitful models of human 
dysfunction and pathologies than current biomedical methods (Marincola 2003). As a consequence 
of this type of research there are now programs where animal patients are trialling potential human 
therapies—such as autologous stem cells for osteoarthritis and new treatments for some forms of 
canine lymphoma. If we look to species interest rather than individual interest, a very different idea 
emerges of how we should act. While the appropriation of ‘diseased’ rather than healthy animals for 
medical research may not always promote the interests of the bearer, under the utilitarian 
framework commonly used to justify these practices it does seem more likely that at least animals of 
the same species might gain some benefit from this type of research, answering some of the 
concerns regarding justice in distribution. For us the notion of ‘good’ in welfare-based approaches is 
too narrow. It is focused on the idea of the good treatment of animals, not good in the sense of 
sound or valid science. It also appears to be a conception of good that does little to promote more 
than the most basic interests of the animals involved in scientific practices. 
Hence, it is arguable that to continue to unreflectively emphasize a focus on ‘welfare’ in the ethical 
renegotiation of animal experimentation fails to address many of the issues that complicate the 
necessity and validity (and therefore the ethical permissibility) of these scientific investigations. 
What is required—at a minimum—is that a further criteria of ‘relevance’ needs to be added to the 
3Rs to force researchers to substantiate the ethical grounds for undertaking each experiment. Even 
if the issues that surround the extrapolation of animal-based scientific knowledge to humans remain 
unresolved, and therefore open to dispute, it is possible that within this extended framework 
ethically and epistemically ‘good’ science can be nudged even closer to becoming a conjoined 
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enterprise (Shanks et al. 2009; Steel 2008). Examples of how this could be achieved can be found in 
medical journals that already demand strict ethical standards. The editorial guidelines for the Lancet 
and the BMJ for instance require that in each original submission the authors clearly articulate their 
principle finding; the strengths and weaknesses of the study and its relation to other similar work; 
and the meaning of the study and its possible implications for other practitioners and policymakers. 
Although not all animal-based research has a clear application it does not seem unreasonable for 
authors publishing in the biosciences to clearly state and justify the significance and stated goals of 
their animal-based investigation, particularly in those cases where the ethical permissibility of the 
research in some way rests on the potential utility of the findings. Whilst consensus on whether we 
‘ought’ to be conducting this type of research remains out of reach, combining concerns for animal 
welfare with a range of editorial measures that force authors to clearly state the context, broader 
significance and likely beneficiaries of their study should provide other species with further 
protection against unnecessary publication-driven research programs. Our preference would be for 
the simultaneous valorisation of research methodologies that in some way also reflect a broader 
conception of the interests of the animal subjects. 
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